Sejarah Zionisme, 1600-1918/Volume 1/Bab 20

CHAPTER XX.

THE SYRIAN PROBLEM

The conflicting interests of the Powers—Was the conflict irreconcilable?—Public opinion—A new principle—The independence of Syria—A neutral position—The Zionist idea as the only solution—A practical proposition.

Public opinion had for a long time laboured under the impression that the intricacy of the Eastern question was due much more to the conflicting interests of the Powers engaged in its solution than to any insurmountable barrier between them and the Sultans Mahmud II., Abdul Medjid and Mehemet Ali. With France and Mehemet Ali on the one side and the four European Powers on the other, it was evident that war would have the most disastrous effect on the contending parties. The question arose whether the interests of the parties were irreconcilable, and whether it was not possible to devise an arrangement acceptable to both sides and thus to avert war. Some political leaders thought that they could settle the question, and that it would be possible to adopt a policy sufficiently far-reaching and just to satisfy the expectations of the five Powers.

It was common knowledge that the great dilemma in which Turkey and Egypt found themselves had throughout hinged on the question of Syria. Without the possession of Syria the power of Mehemet Ali became insecure; with it he would be in a very strong position, because Turkey could only exist by his sufferance. In fact, the possession of Syria would give a tremendous advantage to either side.

The problem was therefore to enable each of the Governments to prevent Syria from passing into the hands of the enemy. And there was only one possible solution—namely, the establishment of an independent state in Syria. The grounds for this conclusion may be stated in the following series of propositions:

(1) That the Sultan, unassisted, was powerless to retain Syria.

(2) That Egypt had no right to Syria, except in so far as lawlessness and violence might make its possession necessary.

(3) That Egypt had a right to independence, if she could achieve it.

(4) That if Syria remained part of Turkey, the independence of Egypt would be constantly menaced.

(5) That if Syria remained part of Egypt, the existence of Turkey would be rendered insecure.

(6) That the insecure position of Turkey would endanger the peace of Europe.

(7) That Syria, being a conquered kingdom, had the right to regain her independence if she could.

(8) That by the existence of Syria as an independent state both Turkey and Egypt would remain intact.

(9) That the neutral position of the new state would keep both Turkey and Egypt in check, and prevent either from becoming too powerful.

Mehemet Ali could not object to a solution on these lines. He would be protected by the Sultan, Abdul Medjid, and would be at liberty to extend his influence in other directions. But the Sultan, having been paramount lord of Syria, might reasonably claim some consideration for consenting to the independence of Syria. Who was to pay this consideration?

It is at this point that we have to turn to the old idea of Zionism to find the only just and natural solution. Bishop Newton’s commentaries, Witherby’s moralisings, Byron’s poetry—to these lines of approach to Zionism was now added the tendency of British politics. A hundred times the promoters of the Zionist idea had been disheartened, a hundred times they had taken it up again. Now political developments offered the background for a new propaganda for Zionism. The Restoration of Israel, an idea dear not only to the sentimentalist, the essayist and the littérateur, but also to every believer in the Bible and to every friend of liberty, had become an actual question of the day.

If only the five European Powers could agree to settle the Eastern question upon the basis of Syrian independence, the carrying out of the details would be an easy matter. France would no doubt agree to such an arrangement. The amount of the consideration required by Turkey would be raised from the resources of Syria, augmented by a sum to be contributed by the Jews. Their contribution might be looked upon as consideration for their admission into Syria.

An arrangement of this character would satisfy all the parties concerned. Mehemet Ali would become the hereditary Sovereign of Egypt. France would be contented. The Jews would be virtually restored to their land. The Syrians would gladly agree, as their country would in this way achieve independence, while the Jews would help them to gain this end.

From then onwards, the Jews would begin to immigrate into Syria from every part of the world; they would carry in their train the apparatus of civilization, and would form a nucleus for the creation of European institutions. They would acquire and exercise the rights and duties of citizenship in their own country, and would build up, under the protection and auspices of the five European Powers, the government and independence of the Turco-Syrian State. And from this change other advantages also would accrue. Turkey would be relieved of the pressure that had been destructive of her interests. The consideration that she would receive for her consent would be the means of resuscitating her energies and restoring her strength. It would enable her to push on her reforms and again take her position as a powerful nation.

It must at once be admitted that the condition of Syria presented a host of difficulties, on account of the division of the inhabitants into a number of separate tribes. But this fact only proved the necessity for the introduction of fresh material, with a view to welding together all classes into one harmonious community. The necessity of introducing fresh material into the social fabric of Syria once admitted, it followed as a matter of course that the immigration of the Jews into Syria would provide the most acceptable material. The establishment of European institutions in Asia (so far as they might be suitable) would follow, and in all probability England would in that way find a new ally, whose friendship might eventually prove of advantage to her in dealing with Eastern affairs.