Sejarah Zionisme, 1600-1918/Volume 1/Bab 52

CHAPTER LII.

BRITISH POLICY IN THE NEAR EAST

The Russo-Turkish War, 1877‒78—The Turkish Revolution—Disappointed hopes—Jewish colonization and British commercial interests in Palestine.

In dealing with the political events of 1839‒40, 1855‒56 and 1860‒61, we have attempted to show that Great Britain has always stood for the regeneration of the Near East—an idea of which political Zionism is an expression, inasmuch as it aims at introducing into the Near East a new civilizing and harmonizing force in the shape of a revived Hebrew nation. If we review the events in connection with the next Near Eastern crisis, that of 1877‒78, we shall find that the guiding idea of British policy was the same.

On April 24th, 1877, Russia declared war against Turkey. After a war of eight to nine months, Russia had approached Constantinople. The treaty of San Stefano was signed on March 3rd, 1878, but it had to be submitted to the European Powers for revision, and to that end the European Powers met in Congress at Berlin on June 13th, 1878, where the whole San Stefano Treaty was to be discussed. Some days before the Congress met—on the 4th of June—a separate convention was concluded between Great Britain and Turkey, under which Great Britain agreed for all time to defend the Asiatic dominions of the Ottoman Empire “by force of arms,” and in return the Sultan, Abdul Hamid, promised to introduce all necessary reforms, as agreed upon with his ally, and to hand over the island of Cyprus for occupation and administration by England at an annual tribute. This convention with Turkey was one of the most important measures of foreign policy which have ever been resolved upon by a British Government. It was a victory, won without bloodshed by English policy, on the Eastern Question. Cyprus is the nearest island to the Suez Canal. At that time England had no position in Egypt close to the Canal itself, and for many reasons the taking of Egyptian territory was impracticable: hence the possession of Cyprus was attended with special advantages. But the possession of Cyprus could not be dissociated from the pledges given by Turkey and the responsibilities taken on by Great Britain with regard to the Asiatic provinces. It was clear that the Asiatic provinces could not be rescued from misrule except by Western agency, and that it was necessary for English authority to be on the spot. Cyprus was considered the best station that could be chosen for such a purpose. The Porte was expected to develop the vast natural resources of its Asiatic Empire, or, at least, to allow that task to be accomplished by others. The Marquess of Salisbury (1830‒1903) made that clear in words of undiplomatic plainness when he stated that the protection of England must depend on the readiness of the Porte “to introduce the necessary reform into the government of the Christians and other subjects of the Porte.” The Jews no less than the Christians and the more enlightened and progressive Mohammedans of the East looked to England for a sort of political and economic renaissance. The occupation of Cyprus brought England into the neighbourhood of Palestine, and made England in the eyes of Zionists the most important Western European power in connection with Palestine.

The same idea guided British policy with regard to Egypt.

In 1882, an early year of Gladstone’s government, Egyptian affairs were growing rapidly worse. On June 11th armed revolt broke out in Alexandria. On July 30th the British Cabinet decided to take action. The Porte was informed by our Ambassador at Constantinople, the Marquess of Dufferin and Ava (1826‒1902), that Great Britain considered that on her was laid the duty of restoring order in Egypt, and of safeguarding the Suez Canal. The services of a Turkish army corps were declined. On August 16th Sir Garnet (afterwards Viscount) Wolseley (1833‒1913) landed at Alexandria, and in September the revolt ended. Major Baring (afterwards the Earl of Cromer) (1841‒1917) was sent to Egypt as British Agent and Consul-General, in order to assume supreme control of Egyptian foreign and home affairs, by means of which peace and stability were eventually to be restored to Egypt, the country was to be freed from external oppression, and internal prosperity such as she had not known for many centuries was to be secured. The real mission of Great Britain was to restore to Egypt a stable Government, which, like that of India, would lead to a just and wise administration of the country. To pretend that such an administration could be developed out of the existing conditions, by giving Egypt a sound constitution by means of the ballot-box, was to ignore the plainest facts of politics. Egypt’s one chance was to procure a strong and permanent protectorate capable of shielding her from rapacious influences from without and from the effects of the political ignorance and weakness wrought within through centuries of abject servility.

Thus throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century British statesmen recognized that the only way to save the near East from decay was to bring a stronger and more healthy influence to bear upon the Turkish Government from without. The idea of a spontaneous regeneration from within was always held to be inadmissible.

But early in the twentieth century events took place which seemed to indicate that Turkey was going to solve her problems for herself. The Turkish Revolution, 1908, marked a new epoch.

The overthrow of the autocracy and the establishment of constitutional government in Turkey were greeted with enthusiasm in England, where even the most advanced Radicals, the most voluble preachers against “the unspeakable Turk,” had entirely stopped “their flow of depreciation.” And on the other side, nothing was so significant and gratifying during the rejoicings which followed the announcement of the Constitution in Turkey as the spontaneous demonstrations of national enthusiasm for Great Britain. Everybody had long been aware that all sections of the Levant populace were filled with friendly feelings towards England, and that different races of the Empire regarded her as their special champion. But in their most sanguine moments Englishmen could not have anticipated such impressive demonstrations as were witnessed in every quarter of the Turkish capital. This friendly feeling was important not only from the political but also from the commercial point of view. For many years past the extension of British commerce in Turkey had been slow; the openings for the development of trade had not been numerous. But under a progressive and friendly Government, bent on setting its house in order and raising Turkey to the rank of a great Power, such drawbacks must immediately disappear.

Unfortunately, the cordial relations at first established between Great Britain and the new Turkey did not endure. British policy took on a different orientation, and Turkey came under other influences. Of the more far-reaching effects of this development it is not within our province to speak. But from the Zionist point of view it was undoubtedly a great misfortune that Great Britain seemed to be abandoning her traditional policy of working for the regeneration of the Near East through the maintenance of friendly relations with Turkey. For the promise of spontaneous internal reform, which was held out for a time by the Turkish revolution, was not fulfilled, and Zionist effort in Palestine, which might have received an enormous impetus, was doomed to struggle on against the obstacles imposed by the inertia and corruptness of a Turkish Government scarcely differing from the old autocracy except in its greater chauvinism.

None the less, it is a fact that the great growth of Palestinian commerce which has accompanied the progress of the Jewish settlement is due mainly to increased trade with the United Kingdom and British possessions. The Consular Reports (Appendix lxxxvii) show that the exports from the Jaffa district amounted to £636,000; over £480,000 worth went to England or Egypt. Thus the Jewish colonization movement has helped in some degree to advance British commercial interests in the Near East.